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A key problem in financial mathematics is the forecasting of financial crashes: if we perturb
asset prices, will financial institutions fail on a massive scale? This was recently shown to be a
computationally intractable (NP-hard) problem. Financial crashes are inherently difficult to predict,
even for a regulator which has complete information about the financial system. In this paper we
show how this problem can be handled by quantum annealers. More specifically, we map the
equilibrium condition of a toy-model financial network to the ground-state problem of a spin-1/2
quantum Hamiltonian with 2-body interactions, i.e., a quadratic unconstrained binary optimization
(QUBO) problem. The equilibrium market values of institutions after a sudden shock to the network
can then be calculated via adiabatic quantum computation and, more generically, by quantum
annealers. Our procedure could be implemented on near-term quantum processors, thus providing
a potentially more efficient way to assess financial equilibrium and predict financial crashes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a financial network where institutions (banks,
companies...) hold a number of assets as well as part
of the other institutions in the network. Could a small
change in asset value cause a massive drop in the market
value of the institutions? Or in other words, could there
be a financial crash? At present, we mainly rely on em-
pirical or statistical tools to answer this question [1–6].
It is not clear that these methods can systematically and
reliably predict financial crashes [7, 8], because indicators
of a crisis generally fail at predicting the next crisis [9].
Our failure to prevent these events is directly responsible
for economic crises and their devastating consequences.
Mathematically, the problem of forecasting a crash is
intractable, even for extremely simple financial networks.
It was recently shown in Ref. [10] that this problem be-
longs to the complexity class NP-hard even for extremely
simple toy models, meaning that there are no known ef-
ficient classical algorithms to solve it1. In general, finan-
cial crashes cannot be avoided by performing stress-tests
or institution evaluations (without a global knowledge of
the network due to privacy issues, thus relying on recon-
struction methods). Even given complete knowledge of
all the assets and cross-holdings in a simple network of
20–30 institutions, it would take more time than the age
of the universe – 13.7 billion years! – to compute the
effect of a perturbation.
1 Mathematically speaking, NP (aka Nondeterministic Polyno-
mial) is the class of problems for which a non-deterministic clas-
sical verifier can check the validity of the solution in polynomial
time. Notice that this does not say anything about the hardness
of finding the solution to the problem. NP-Hard is the class of
problems for which finding the solution cam be reduced, in poly-
nomial time, to that of finding the solution of any problem in
NP. Those NP-Hard problems that are also in NP are called NP-
Complete. In practice, NP-Complete and NP-Hard problems are
amongst the hardest problems in computer science.
While the situation might seem dire, there are proof-of-
principle calculations showing that quantum computing
may be able to tackle this type of problems more effi-
ciently, both in theory [11, 12] and in practice [13–16]. In
particular, quantum computing has proved to be a valid
alternative at tackling some complex financial problems
[17–19].
In this paper, we show that the problem of predict-
ing financial crashes and, more generically, assessing the
equilibrium of a financial network, is amenable to quan-
tum annealers, at least for simple financial toy models.
These quantum processors solve problems using the idea
of adiabatic quantum computation, which uses nature’s
remarkable ability to find the lowest-energy eigenstate –
the ground state – of complex Hamiltonians [20]. We be-
gin by showing that finding the equilibrium condition of a
simple toy-model financial network is equivalent to find-
ing the ground-state of a specific spin-1/2 Hamiltonian
with 2-body interactions. This is our problem Hamilto-
nian, which has the form of a quadratic unconstrained
binary optimization (QUBO) problem, and which com-
mercially available quantum annealers are well suited to
solve [12]. Once the annealer finds a candidate ground
state, we can forecast a potential crash simply by reading
out the system’s state, interpreted as a financial equilib-
rium configuration.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sec. II we
describe the toy model of financial network. In Sec. III
we show how computing the equilibrium configuration
of such a financial network is equivalent to finding the
ground state of some quantum spin Hamiltonian. In
Sec. IV we discuss on the required resources to imple-
ment the resulting Hamiltonian, specifically the required
number of qubits. In Sec. V we exemplify the model of fi-
nancial network with a simple numerical experiment for a
randomly-generated network, observing a crash. Finally,
in Sec. VI we wrap up with our conclusions and remarks.
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2II. FINANCIAL NETWORK MODEL
We consider here a simple model of financial network
proposed originally in Ref. [21]. In this model there are
n institutions as well as m assets. Institutions could
be countries, banks, companies... whereas an asset is
any object or project with an intrinsic value. Finan-
cial institutions can own shares of the underlying assets.
Moreover, there are interdependencies between the in-
stitutions modelled by linear dependencies. Such cross-
holdings model the fact that some institutions may own
shares of other institutions, as well as approximate debt
contracts between institutions.
Mathematically, we denote by pk the price of asset
k, and by Dik ≥ 0 the fraction (percentage) of asset
k owned by institution i. We define D as the n × m
matrix of ownership. Additionally, let C be the n × n
matrix of cross-holdings among institutions. The com-
ponent Cij ≥ 0 is the fraction of institution j owned
by institution i. Following the convention in Refs. [21]
and [10], we set Cii = 0, and define C˜jj ≡ 1 −
∑
i Cij
as the amount of self-ownership of institution j. Ma-
trix C˜ is thus a diagonal matrix with entries C˜jj on the
diagonal. The model can then be seen in terms of a com-
plex network of interdependencies. Following Ref. [10],
we further define the equity value Vi of institution i as
Vi =
∑
kDikpk +
∑
j CijVj , i.e., the value of institution
i due to ownership of assets and cross-holdings. In ma-
trix notation, we can then write ~V = D~p+C~V , such that
~V = (I−C)−1D~p. As explained in Ref. [10], matrix I−C
is guaranteed to be invertible. Additionally, the market
value vi of institution i is its equity value rescaled with
its self-ownership, i.e., vi = C˜iiVi. The market values are
then the solution to the linear equation
~v = C˜~V = C˜(I−C)−1D~p. (1)
As explained in Refs.[10, 21], the model further intro-
duces the notion of failure. This means that if the mar-
ket value of an institution drops below a certain critical
threshold, then the institution suffers an extra discontin-
uous loss in equity value. This non-linear behavior mod-
els the fact that if an institution cannot pay its own op-
erating costs, then it may see a sudden drop in revenues.
Moreover, if confidence in the institution is downgraded,
then it may also see a sudden drop in its value since it
will become difficult to, e.g., attract investors. Mathe-
matically, this is modelled by a step-function such that
if the market value vi of institution i drops below a crit-
ical threshold vci , then it incurs a failure and its equity
value drops by an additional βi(~p). Thus, if we define
bi(vi, ~p) ≡ βi(~p)(1−Θ(vi − vci )) with Θ(x) the Heaviside
step-function, then the market values satisfy
~v = C˜(I−C)−1
(
D~p−~b(~v, ~p)
)
. (2)
While Eq. (refeq1) is linear, Eq. (2) is highly non-linear
due to the presence of the failure term~b(~v, ~p). In practice,
this non-linearity is what makes it extremely difficult to
determine the market values of institutions after a small
change in the prices of assets. Specifically, given an equi-
librium which satisfies Eq. (2), if the sum of all assets’
prices drop by d, then it is NP-hard to determine the
maximum number of failures that could happen once the
new equilibrium is reached [10]. This means that predict-
ing a crash of the financial network due to small changes
of the individual prices of assets is a computationally-
intractable problem. Let us also remark that this simple,
minimal model of financial network, does not target the
probability of a change of prices happening, but rather
what will happen to the network shall this change take
place.
III. FINANCIAL EQUILIBRIUM AS QUANTUM
GROUND STATE
In the following, we will describe how to find a state
which satisfies the financial equilibrium condition on a
quantum annealer. We begin by stating the financial
equilibrium condition, Eq. (2), as a variational problem.
We then express this variational problem in terms of clas-
sical binary variables, and promote it to the problem of
finding the ground state of a spin-1/2 Hamiltonian with
many-qubit interactions. Finally, we reduce the many-
qubit interactions to 2-qubit interactions, which are eas-
ier to implement experimentally [22]. We will also calcu-
late the computational resources necessary to solve this
problem.
A. Variational Setup
Given set of institutions, holdings and prices, the mar-
ket values ~v at financial equilibrium satisfy Eq. (2). This
equilibrium may not be unique. In general, though, one
would have
F (~v) ≡
(
~v − C˜(I−C)−1
(
D~p−~b(~v, ~p)
))2
≥ 0. (3)
The above expression is strictly larger than zero away
from equilibrium, and equal to zero and therefore mini-
mum at equilibrium. Thus, we have recast the problem
of finding the market values in equilibrium as a varia-
tional problem: the vector ~v at equilibrium will be the
one that minimizes the classical cost function F (~v) for a
given network configuration.
B. Bit variables for market values
We now write F (~v) in terms of classical bit variables.
This can be done by approximating the vi variables in
terms of 2q + 1 classical bits using the usual binary no-
3tation,
vi ≈
q∑
α=−q
xi,α2
α, (4)
with bits xi,α = 0, 1. The market value vi of institution
i is then codified, up to the desired approximation, by
the string of bits (xi,−q, xi,−q+1, · · · , xi,q). This sets an
upper-bound on market value vi of v
max
i =
∑q
α=−q 2
α.
C. Polynomial expansion of failure
Next, we need a procedure to deal with the failure
terms ~b(~v, ~p), which are highly non-linear and modelled
by the Heaviside unit step function, which is discontin-
uous. In order to obtain an appropriate Hamiltonian
for a quantum annealer, it would be desirable to have a
continuous function instead. Moreover, we will need a
Hamiltonian that can be efficiently described, even if it
has many-qubit interactions. Under these constraints, we
have found that the most viable option is to approximate
the Heaviside function by a polynomial expansion. Of
course, such an expansion is not unique. While it would
be possible to find the optimal polynomial of a given de-
gree approximating the function in a given interval and
for a given error norm [23], standard approximations ex-
ist in terms of, e.g., shifted Legendre polynomials [24],
which are sufficient to show the validity of our approach.
In particular, one can make use of the Fourier-Legendre
expansion
Θ(x) =
1
2
+
∞∑
l=1
(Pl−1(0) + Pl+1(0))Pl(x), (5)
in the interval [−1, 1], with Pl(x) the lth Legendre Poly-
nomial. As shown in Fig. 1, the truncated series produces
a reasonable approximation to the sudden discontinuity
of the failure for polynomials of moderate-order. In our
case, we can choose x = (vi − vci )/vmaxi , so that we get
directly the expansion for Θ(vi−vci ) = Θ((vi−vci )/vmaxi )
in the correct range vi ∈ [0, vmaxi ].
Thus, from now on we will take the approximation
bi(vi, ~p) ≈ βi(~p)Polyr(vi − vci ), (6)
where Polyr(vi − vci ) is some polynomial of degree r in
(vi−vci ) and domain [0, vmaxi ]. This approximation makes
the failure term easier to handle for our purposes, while
still being strongly non-linear.
D. Promoting to quantum Hamiltonian
At this point we promote function F (~v) in Eq. (3) to
a quantum Hamiltonian, under the approximations de-
scribed above. Specifically, we have now a classical func-
tion G(xi,α) ≈ F (~v), where xi,α are the bits for the mar-
ket value vi of institution i, and where we also used the
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Figure 1. [Color online] Polynomial approximation of the step
function in the interval [−1, 1] by the Fourier-Legendre series
in Eq. (5), truncating in orders 10, 30, 50 and 70, in dimen-
sionless units. The higher the order, the more accurate is the
approximation.
polynomial approximation of the step function in Eq. (6).
Considering Eqs.(3), (4) and (6) together, one can see af-
ter some inspection that G(xi,α) is also a polynomial in
the bit variables xi,α. More specifically,
G(xi,α) = Poly2r(xi,α), (7)
i.e., it is a Boolean polynomial of degree 2r.
We then define the quantum Hamiltonian by promot-
ing the classical bit variables xi,α = 0, 1 to diagonal
qubit operators xˆi,α with eigenvalues 0, 1, i.e., xˆi,α|0〉 =
0, xˆi,α|1〉 = |1〉. In terms of spin-1/2 Pauli operators,
these can be written as xˆ = (1 + σˆz)/2, with σˆz the
z-Pauli matrix. The quantum Hamiltonian is then
Hˆ ≡ G(xˆi,α), (8)
which is nothing but the left hand side of Eq. (3), with
the failure term approximated polynomially as in Eq. (6),
and written in terms of qubit operators. This Hamilto-
nian is automatically hermitian. It is also a polynomial
of degree 2r in the qubit operators. Each term in Hˆ in-
volves many-qubit interactions for different sets of qubits,
ranging from 0-qubit terms up to 2r-qubit terms at most.
The explicit form of the Hamiltonian can be computed
whenever necessary on a case-by-case basis. The number
of terms in Hˆ will be analyzed later in detail.
E. From many-qubit to 2-qubit
The Hamiltonian in Eq. (8) could already be used as
input for a quantum annealer that allowed for multiqubit
interactions [22, 25]. However, state-of-the-art quan-
tum processors target, for practical reasons, Hamiltoni-
ans with at most 2-qubit interactions. Mathematically,
finding the ground state of such Hamiltonians amounts
to solving QUBO problems. It would then be desirable
4J
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σ^2
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Figure 2. Topology of interactions for the Hamiltonian in
Eq. (10), following Fig. 1 of Ref. [22], for the case of a 4-
qubit interaction proportional to σˆz1 σˆ
z
2 σˆ
z
3 σˆ
z
4 . Qubits on the
left hand side (dark grey) are the logical qubits, and those on
the right hand side (white) are the ancillas.
to have a Hamiltonian made of at most 2-qubit interac-
tions. Thus, the final step of our derivation is to bring
the interactions in the Hamiltonian of Eq. (8) down to
2-qubit terms at most.
To get such a modified Hamiltonian, we use the tech-
nique proposed in Ref. [22], which allows to implement
effective k-qubit interactions using k extra ancilla qubits
and 2-qubit interactions only. Suppose that we are given
a k-qubit interaction Hˆk of the type
Hˆk = Jkσˆ
z
1 · · · σˆzk, (9)
where for convenience we now use the notation in terms
of the z-Pauli matrix and Jk is the interaction prefactor.
The trick is to write another Hamiltonian Hˆ2, made of
at most 2-qubit interactions, and such that it reproduces
the low-energy spectrum of Hˆk. This is achieved by in-
troducing k extra ancilla qubits and the Hamiltonian
Hˆ2 = J
k∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
σˆzi σˆ
z
j + h
k∑
i=1
σˆzi
+ Ja
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
σˆzi σˆ
z
j,a +
k∑
i=1
hai σˆ
z
i,a. (10)
The topology of the interactions is shown in Fig. 2. All
the “logical” qubits σˆzi are all coupled among themselves
via 2-body interactions with strength J . Each ancilla
qubits σˆzi,a are coupled to every logical qubits, with 2-
body interactions of strength Ja. Moreover, there are
magnetic fields h and hai accounting for 1-qubit terms.
The idea, as explained in Ref. [22], is to find the values of
J, Ja, h and hai such that the low-energy spectrum of Hˆ2
reproduces the energy spectrum of Hˆk. This is achieved
by the choice
J = Ja, hai = −Ja(2i− k) + qi,
h = −Ja + q0, qi = (−1)k−i+1Jk + q0, (11)
with any q0 satisfying the conditons |Jk|  q0 < Ja
and |Jk|  Ja − q0 < Ja. The low-energy sector of the
Hamiltonian in Eq. (10), with couplings as in Eq. (11),
Figure 3. [Color online] Example of a random financial net-
work with 10 institutions. Dots correspond to institutions and
links to the cross-holdings. The amount of the cross-holdings
corresponds to the thickness of the links.
reproduces the spectrum of the Hamiltonian in Eq. (9)
up to an overall additive energy constant. This is guar-
anteed for the part of the spectrum satisfying |Hˆk|  Ja,
and allows the annealer to sample over low-energy states
effectively reproducing the energy landscape of the many-
qubit interactions on logical qubits.
IV. REQUIRED RESOURCES
Let us now consider how many qubits are needed.
First, 2q + 1 qubits are required to describe each one
of the n market values vi, amounting to a total cost in
logical qubits of Nlogical = n(2q+ 1). Second, the cost in
ancilla qubits Nancilla can be estimated from the number
of interaction terms Nterms composing the Hamiltonian.
A spin Hamiltonian constructed from a Boolean polyno-
mial of degree 2r has 0-qubit terms, 1-qubit terms, . . . ,
2r-qubit terms, giving a maximum of
Nterms =
2r∑
α=0
(
n(2q + 1)
α
)
, (12)
interaction terms. For nq  r and 2r < n(2q + 1)/2,
the leading term of Eq. (12) is the binomial coefficient
for α = 2r. Thus, for n(2q + 1)  2r together with
2nq  n, and using (2r)! ≥ (2r/e)2r, we have that
Nterms = O
((enq
r
)2r)
. (13)
Therefore, the number of terms to specify the Hamilto-
nian is a polynomial in n and q, whose degree is controlled
by r. This means that the total number of qubits Nqubits
needed to implement our protocol is
Nqubits = Nlogical+Nancilla = n(2q+1)+O
(
r
(enq
r
)2r)
,
(14)
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Figure 4. [Color online] Number of failures in the financial
network of Fig. 3 as a function of the perturbation amplitude,
as described in the text. A financial crash happens when the
perturbation is around ∼ 60. The plot is in dimensionless
units.
where we used Nancilla = O(r · Nterms). Since r is the
degree of the polynomial approximating the step func-
tion, we see that this is actually acting as a resource
truncation parameter: it controls the scaling exponent
of the required resources. Two important remarks about
Eq. (14) are also in order. First, it is an asymptotic ex-
pression which often heavily overestimates the number
of qubits required in practice. Second, it implies that
for a moderate value of r the failure term can be very
strongly non-linear, which is what makes the classical
problem NP-hard, while keeping a polynomial scaling of
the required quantum resources. In fact, this problem
is NP-hard for any r ≥ 2, because our derivation shows
that it is as hard as finding the ground state of an ar-
bitrary spin-glass [26]. Consequently, the computational
running time will depend on the specifics of the instance
and of the quantum annealing process, exactly as for the
spin-glass problem.
V. A SIMPLE NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
We provide in this section a simple numerical example
in order to show a typical crash situation. We have at
least two motivations for this. First, we believe that this
example shows very clearly several of the concepts dis-
cussed earlier, which may be easier to understand with a
simple plot rather than with many equations. Second, it
provides an idea of a range of parameters where it would
be possible to observe the “crash” on a quantum proces-
sor2.
2 Notice that Ref.[18] is assessing financial equilibrium, but not
the crash itself.
We generated a random financial network with 10 in-
stitutions, with a minimum self-ownership of 0.5, as well
as with 20 assets, with prices ranging from 0 to 100. We
then perturb the network by substracting a random vec-
tor from the asset prices. This perturbation has a maxi-
mum amplitude ∈ [0, 80]. We then look at the number of
failures of institutions as a function of the perturbation
amplitude.
Following the above procedure we generated an exam-
ple of random financial network as in Fig. 3. In the figure,
dots correspond to the institutions and links and their
thickness represent cross-holdings and their amount. For
the perturbation that we described, we find that the num-
ber of failures depends on the perturbation as in Fig. 4.
We clearly see the phase transition from the “normal”
to the “crash” phase in the figure: when the perturba-
tion amplitude is ∼ 60, basically all 10 institutions in
the financial network fail, i.e., their market values drop
to zero. Notice that the region were the crash happens
is very small, roughly for the perturbation amplitude be-
tween 55 and 62. Following standard condensed-matter
arguments (finite-size scaling), the amplitude of this re-
gion is expected to shrink as the number of institutions
grows, thus making the transition sharper and therefore
making the prediction of the crash after a small pertur-
bation even harder.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
Here we have shown how the problem of forecasting
financial crashes, which is NP-hard, can be handled by
quantum annealers, at least for some simple toy-models
of financial network. Specifically, our procedure allows
the efficient construction of a QUBO formula by writing
Eq. (3) in terms of z-Pauli matrices and 2-qubit inter-
actions only, and which can be used in state-of-the-art
quantum processors to predict a potential massive fail-
ure of financial institutions after a small shock to the
system. Our result shows that quantum computers could
help, at least in principle, in forecasting such situations,
in addition to other known applications in finance [17].
One should however keep in mind that current quan-
tum processors still have limited computational capabil-
ities, specially in comparison with the best state-of-the-
art classical algorithms. Nevertheless, and still within
these limitations, it is already possible to perform proof-
of-principle experiments with such quantum processors,
paving the way towards the development of more power-
ful and less noisy quantum computational devices.
While our results are constructed for a minimal finan-
cial network model, more complex networks can be han-
dled similarly. Thus, these results show that near-term
quantum processors, such as the D-Wave machine, may
become useful in the early prediction of financial crashes.
From a broader perspective, our results show how quan-
tum computers can be used to handle problems related
to financial equilibrium, and in particular to forecast the
6financial consequences of different courses of action.
There is plenty of room for further research. For in-
stance, we could explore ways of improving the efficiency
and accuracy of our procedure. This is particularly im-
portant, since the number of required qubits, as esti-
mated in Sec. IV, grows up quickly with the number
of institutions and the precision required for the non-
linear term, thus hindering a practical application of our
protocol. In spite of this, in a separate publication [18]
we present an experimental implementation of our al-
gorithm on a commercially available quantum annealing
processor, where QUBO formulas are the input, and for
a limited number of qubits, thus showing that such an
implementation is indeed possible, at least as a proof
of principle. Notice, though, that more complex finan-
cial network models may require of extra resources which
were not considered here. Additionally, it would be very
interesting to extend this protocol to deal with other fi-
nancial equilibrium problems.
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